

### III. FROM THE EASTERN TO THE WESTERN CIVILIZATION AND BEYOND

#### LIFE WORLD AND GLOBAL CIVILIZATION

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The article is designed to demonstrate that the Western modern life world is constituted by the reconstruction of the natural environment in accordance with formal logical rules that are not derivable from contingent facts. Logical rules are selected as techniques in terms of their value to fulfill “needs” and hence to shape the environment into a “technical life world” that becomes globalized as “scientific” demanding that the life worlds of the others develop to become modern and technical. This means that the globalized technical life world is not a set of facts but signitive systems of logical, non-temporal and non-spacial vectors of “communication” taking precedence over the material-productive levels of any society.

Keywords: contingency, formal logic, life world, metaphysical, signification, technology.

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#### Introduction

Modern Western life world seems to be one among many such worlds, yet its “logic” is spreading globally, thus creating a global civilization without national borders. The task of this essay is to offer this “logic” which is usually unnoticed although implicitly assumed as a ground of all global engagements. We know that throughout the course of the twentieth century scientific thought was in a quandary concerning its own basis: science with its theories and methods wanted to be logical, precise and rational; but it also wanted to make ontological claims wherein the only objective reality is physical-empirical providing the ground of explanation for all phenomena. Moreover, science is value free and any valuation belongs to the subjective realm, which too must be explained empirically. It is our contention that the case is not only more complex but science assumes the objectivity of something that is not derivable from any empirical facts. This is to say, the first condition of science – being logical – is not accessible from any empirical position; second, the notion that science is value free, is equally mistaken; given that there are various logical and self-consistent systems, the

selectivity of one system over another is a matter of valuation and, above all, cultural valuation. Cultural valuation belongs to a life world that consists of intersections of events, each pointing one to the other in complex ways, and each bearing various social meanings (Greimas 1987). In this context, science is one set of such meanings that must be located in its function in terms of its practical, cultural, and technical significance. This suggests that even technical inventions are not just entities, but comprise a complex system of life world interconnections, such as values, economy, productivity, education, politics, and even ideologies (Mickunas 1997). This, of course, will have to be shown in a detailed and precise manner.

It is also the case that the current life world is interlaced by multiple scientific and technical discourses and practices. One cannot buy a cereal box without being exposed to multiple languages and quantities of bio-chemical, nutritional, caloric, etc. codes. All this also implicates productive, normative, and even legalistic interconnections as aspects of a life world. This is to say, the scientific and technical discourses and practices do not overlay some primordial life world, but comprise our understanding of the way our world and we are, live and relate. Our mass media are equally replete with reports of scientific “studies” and reports of inventions and progress, and even of protests against some scientific inventions and technical innovations – all being understood as aspects of our life world. No wonder, then, that our technologies are regarded equally as “objective” as trees and cucumbers. Scientific practice cannot demonstrate how logic of a given consistent system becomes “applied” to the empirical world without the assumption of other conditions that are technically available. After all, there is a preunderstanding of the entire environment as accessible to technical management, allowing a given population to regard science as “value free”. Yet it is precisely the technologically interpreted environment that is pervaded by valuations. We must explicate the principles that: first, establish scientific objectivity on the basis of the objectivity of logic; second, how logic is connected to the resources of the environment; third, how the environment itself is technical and valuative; and fourth, how particular modern value context pervades the technical logical and scientific enterprises (Husserl 1970).

### Logic and fact

In this section the question of scientific objectivity will be addressed in terms of the understanding of facts as contingent. By the latter is meant that every given factual state of affairs could be otherwise than it is. Such states of affairs have no necessity. Yet science is designed to connect empirical facts by necessary rules. In principle, even if those rules are distributive such that facts are read as statistically probable, the very logic of probability is necessary. This implies that there is an essential difference between scientific rules of calculation of probabilities as necessary and the calculated empirical facts as contingent. The former cannot be derived from the latter. Moreover, any scientist, despite the claim that empirical objectivity is the only source of

truth, will also demand respect for scientific formal rules and logic as necessary and objective. This suggests that science accepts logic to be another domain of objectivity without being able to account for it on the grounds of the presumed empirical reality (Husserl 1973).

To avoid other confusions, we add other variations of the difference between logic and fact. Psychologists argued that since empirical – physical – facts are the only reliable sources of knowledge, everything else is subjective and psychological. In this sense, the theory was proposed and is still maintained that since logic is not an empirical objective fact then it must be a subjective fact. In turn, since psychology claims to be the science of subjective facts, it also claims that logic can be understood psychologically. This is to say, logical formulations of science can be derived from psychological facts. Obviously, this is a contradiction since every psychological fact, as empirical, is radically contingent and it cannot imply any necessary rules or laws. Moreover, if psychology were the basis of logic, it would then be the basis of all sciences. In this sense, even logically framed laws of physics would be derivable from psychological facts (Seeböhm 1962). We are certain that no physicist will grant such an absurd theory.

Other sciences, such as sociology, have made claims that all theories, including logically framed theories, are social constructs. They can be explained by social interests, whether such interests are economic or power, and therefore the analysis of social conditions would imply scientific theories and their logic. This is a variant of the psychological theory; instead of deriving science from individual psychological facts, we presume to derive science from collective social facts. This is to say, we simply postpone the issue without resolving it. Moreover, a description of social facts such as collective activities and interests would not imply the logic of social sciences. The latter, as a science, will already presume to be able to arrange social facts in the framework of scientific rules. Such rules will not respect the differences between social facts, psychological facts, or physical facts. They will be regarded as universal and necessary, so well testified even by sociology in its effort to become “scientific”.

Another thesis that is currently in vogue is one of evolutionism. This thesis assumes various forms, such as historicism, pedagogy, cumulative affect, and all claiming that while our current scientific knowledge is vast it was slowly accumulated through historical learning transmission, and ultimately through the pressures and needs of life. In one sense, what we know now, we have learned from our predecessors, and in turn added our own empirical experience, thus providing a continuing process and evolution of knowledge. We do not doubt that there is cumulative empirical experience from generation to generation providing subsequent generations with a more complex understanding of themselves and their environment. But such an accumulation is equally contingent and does not imply the logic of sciences. The point is that empirical experiences, no matter how vast, can go on in their accumulation without ever leading to formulation of logical rules (Mickunas 1997).

Given the problematic of current explanations of logic from psychology through accumulation of factual experience, we can argue that there is a difference between

two main domains of objectivity, such that every explanation will presuppose these two domains. In this sense, we propose that the scientific domain that becomes translated into technology is one of pure signification with its own rules of implication that in many cases defy our own abilities to master such rules. At least for modern age this means that sciences of all types are subject to this signitive domain. If one were simply to consider the constitution of various formalized geometries, one would be convinced that the psycho-physiological beings that we are could not access such geometries. This requires another epistemic layer that is correlated to formalized systems whose parameters are vectors of significations (Husserl 1932).

### Signitive world

There are theoretical notions that something is either given as a fact or a proposition that is derived from a number of facts – a general proposition. Assuming that the move from facts to general propositions is even possible, such a move will not account for our disregard of the meaning of general propositions and their use in a context of formal demonstrations. This is to say that general propositions will turn out to be inadequate to demonstrate formal conditions. Hence, there is no connection between generalization and formalization. Formal operations employ rules that need not respect the truth or falsity of general propositions. In this sense, formalization is a signitive process that correlates to rules such as addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division in arithmetic; or rules of implication, inference, deduction in logic, which do not reflect anything that is available in generalized propositions. Thus we can operate by excluding both empirical facts and the general propositions derived from them, and construct in turn empirical facts based on formal requirements. In brief, we can formulate mathematical rules and use any empirical fact to instantiate such rules. Moreover, using such rules, we can transform empirical facts by our practical activities in a way that the facts will be directly constructed on the basis of the formal rules. This is one level at which material technology arises.

Technology, at this level, is in principle a transformation of the environmental factors into signitive life world. This suggests that the very factual objectivity, transformed in this way, is a system of formal signitive relationships. Given that the modern conception of the environment is regarded to be the sum of material parts that are qualitatively and essentially indifferent, then such materiality can be used as a condition for any possible reconstruction on the grounds of formal systems. This state of affairs implies that our technical life world is more basically a system of signitive interconnections (Mickunas 1983). But in principle the formal systems already have a subtext: they themselves are technologies of reconstruction of the material environment. Thus despite scientific claims to be based on empirical facts, the practice of science that assumes the objectivity of formal systems as a condition for doing science is a process of application that treats the formal sciences as techniques requiring the reconstruction of the environment, in ways that the formal techniques imply (Schabert 1978).

One constantly talks about applying sciences to reality in order to test whether the application is warranted or not. In a superficial way, this is known as testing of hypotheses. Obviously, testing the hypothesis does not simply mean opening your eyes and looking, but using highly sophisticated technical means. The latter are already constructed on the basis of formal requirements as a mediation between the so-called physical material world and the logic of science. In this sense, the very testing of hypothesis presupposes the background of formal systems that are imbedded in material techniques. There emerge phenomena that are **self-generating** and are beyond anyone's control: 1) formal systems that have no cause and no empirical base and disregard any empirical generalization, and, therefore, can be used at will; 2) the empirical environment reduced to indifferent material substance that does not imply any qualitative differences; 3) any qualitative generalizations do not imply the formal systems; and, 4) the view of the formal systems as hypotheses to be tested in the factual world implies that the factual world will have to be drawn into the signitive process of the formal systems. But as we said before this is technology – the formal systems are reified into sundry instrumentalities which, as mentioned above, compose the modern Western life world. This logic of “self-generating” formal systems that get directly translated into material implements implies that even the material facts are co-extensive with the signitive domain of formal constructions (Jonas 1981). The transformation of materiality into signitive conditions implies that the social environment is a life world structure, consisting of a system of multiple implications. To speak in a limited traditional sense, all social factual phenomena are not merely factual, but already signitive. In this sense, the world we live in is social, historical, scientific, and technical world of multiple signitive vectors, all comprising a modern life world which is a construct that purports to be explanatory and self-explanatory.

The reason for this self-explanation is the valuation which is in a background that grants certain formal systems the practical value to transform the environment in favor of the so-called “human needs”. Once again, what is theoretically at issue is that human needs as empirical be they psychological, sociological, or economic, do not imply formal-signitive systems. Therefore, the latter will have to be constructed and selected as values to correspond to those needs. We must note that the selection of the formal systems as valuable to fulfill the needs has no direct connection with such needs. The latter are psychological, biological, social, economic, while the former are signitive. In other words, one is premised on empirical generalizations as various needs, the other is formal systems that must be connected to such needs by way of technical implementation. Therefore, the selection of the formal systems that would be relevant will have a criterion that has to be translated into formal systems. This means that the criterion will be some valuative principle that will facilitate the decision as to which formal system will be adequate to apply for the fulfillment of which needs. In this sense, there is again a way of saying that the formal systems have to become techniques to fulfill the criteria of empirical needs. Yet the process is still more complex: the needs themselves are also selected in terms of their significance in a given life world, and hence are not a mere observation and generalization of empirical

phenomena. In principle formal systems as signitive are valuative to the extent that they can fulfill the desires that are equally articulated in terms of socially, psychologically, and economically signified needs.

The signitive logics that pervade the life world, with the latter's valuative selectivities, is also at the background of cybernetic revolution. This is to say, while the cybernetic revolution brought in computer science, it has at the same time included as a background of the self-generating process of formal systems that are translated and reified into the technical environment. The computerized logic as formal has no regard to anything that is environmentally, qualitatively differentiated. Its own logic does not need to respect the so called "natural-qualitative" differentiations. Any living, working, suffering being in this logic of indifference that transcends such a being, can regard all events in terms of mutually replaceable variants. Social, economic, pedagogical, cultic, cultural givens are, in this logic, equivalences in normative exchanges. Whether something is labor power, art work, mysticism must subject itself to the requirements of formal rules of quantification. The latter, the quantification, must become the information to be transmitted globally. While previously tele-visual globalization was available and this globalization depended on valuative selectivity of large media organizations, the computerized globalization offers any arbitrary access to any selectivity. This means that rhetorical propositions as translatable into practices will be equivalent to other propositions. No external judgment is possible apart from an appeal to other computerized information whose credibility is simply the appearance in the global network. Computerization opens up a domain of any space and any time accessed without history, without places and without times. It is a synchronic instrument premised on signification that is everywhere and yet not localizable. The age of the computer is a world of signification where there is no place and time and, conversely, where all places and all times are equivalently accessible. Our task is therefore to explore the domain of all places and all times.

### Signitive space and time

As we already saw, regardless of the arguments given by positivist historians and anthropologists, the simple access to the past is not read as empirical, but conversely every empirical discovered datum is read as a text that means. This is to say that what we call the past is not accessed empirically, since in principle we cannot be there empirically (for example we cannot be at the battle of Waterloo), but we access those events by reading texts, monuments, not as empirical data but as various systems. This is to say that time and space wherein we locate empirical events is accessible only as a signitive framework of sense making to which everyone has access. Given that we have no time machines to go from now into the future or the past, the only access we have to both of those temporal components is the immediacy of meaning and sense making awareness. In this sense, the globalizing process of cybernetic revolution is based on our ability to communicate irrespective of place and time on the globe, because we know or understand what the others mean. This suggests that

dealing with the computer technology we are presented with immediate access to the entire world, not because of our capacity to be empirically everywhere, but because of the technical capacity to make present significantly constituted events no matter how far or near in the so-called real space and time. In this sense, when someone reads the computer messages, that someone does not question the presence of such messages, despite the empirical fact that those messages originated ten thousand miles away. In this sense, one reads signification as temporally and spatially indifferent.

In our argument, we note that the reading of a message is prior to and pervades the empirical means that transmit the message. Computer, as technological means, is a spacio-temporal entity, but it is designed to carry the presence of significations that have no specific space-time positions. This would be analogous to the construction of the non-Euclidean space. The latter has no empirically given intuitive component. It is a pure system of formal constructs that does not point to any material, mental, or other “realistic factors”. Yet non-Euclidean geometry is regarded as an important way of articulating (if not actually constructing) other dimensions capable of transforming life world environment (Ströker 1965). This kind of non-positional objectivity is a condition for computerized communication to the extent that it does not require either the senders or the receivers of messages to have the same mental-physical experience. As we suggested above, there is a variation between the empirical and the significant such that it is possible to have different empirical factors making the same sense and one empirical factor having diverse senses. Since the major level of computer signification is logic, then there is a constructive connection between this logic and various life world facts, and in turn such facts can be articulated and reconstructed by different computer logics.

Given the computer non-positional logics, and given that they can be carried by appropriate technologies, then in principle it is possible to select and to transmit the sense of any event as if it were immediately present to anyone. What is at issue is the process of selectivity that is not implied by the constructed logics and by the empirical events such logics frame. Here we encounter the question of selectivity as valuation. Among numerous events signified in a life world, some are regarded as important and valuable. At this level, valuation does not have any rules that could be derived from either domain, the formal-logical or the technically constructed events of the life world. What is required by our analysis are the value conditions that connect signification and such events. The point we have reached is the previously mentioned requirement of connecting logic with fact, mathematics with data, and sense making with events. Since the systems of signification are constitutable at will, they themselves do not imply which of them are relevant to the social, economic, pedagogical, cultural aspects of a life world. Resultantly, the very constitution of significant systems requires a value criteria which would say: 1) what formal systems among all possibilities should be applied to what aspects and events; and, 2) the criteria for the constitution of specific formal systems must be part of a society, a political society, political economy, political economical ideology, that would provide a clue concerning what is relevant among possible formal systems. In fact, we would argue that the very construction of

computer technology based on logical signification is a technology that embodies valuation. This is to say we elect to build this instead of other technology. This is simply to remind us that technology embodies valuative conditions and therefore it cannot be regarded as a mere empirical fact.

What is appropriate to the theme of space and time is that the technical means that embody the formal logic and its valuative subtext can be produced and set up anywhere and any time around the world. Yet it is to be noted that such a set up carries with it the social-cultural, economic, and technical life world. Thus, first world imports and transfers the latest technologies to the third world in order to help “develop” the local populations, to make them aware of the rest of the world, in brief in order for them to be signitively accessible and accessing events no matter where and when. This globalizing transference of technology brings with it non-positional space-time to all who can afford the technological means. We must remind ourselves that those very global means are not mere empirical data or facts, but carry with them valuative conditions. For modern Western understanding, values are deemed to be subjective, in contrast to the objectivity of the empirical, and as we have argued, to the logical-signitive domain. Yet the very selectivity of certain logics over others and of their connection to the events is valuative. Exporting computer (and other) technologies also includes the export of values imbedded in technologies.

### Valuative nexus

The ideology of science has been all along that there is a difference between value and fact, and that science is value free. We have argued that the required connection between logic and fact introduces a third component which at base is valuative. This is to say that the very understanding of application of logically framed theories or hypotheses introduces selectivity among various hypotheses and selectivity what domains in the environment are relevant for application and hence techno-logical reconstruction. The reconstruction is an activity premised on human purposes and resultanty on various levels of valuation interpreted in various ways, such as sociological, psychological, economic, ideological, and even mythological. Since scientifically speaking values do not belong to objectivity, then they are part of the world either of subjective or intersubjective proposals. We are not contending that such proposals are totally arbitrary, based on individualistic desires, but we are contending that even when they are interpreted socially, they still are primarily values. Even if we quantify values and claim to have gained objective data, we have not, therefore, abolished their value function (Luhmann 1981).

This leads us to the understanding of computer rationality as purposive, value laden, and, therefore, premised on individual or social purposes. We shall argue that the computer rationality consist of layers of value systems and in final analysis valuations that both promote autonomous selectivity and invention, and in turn place demands on individuals and groups. To engage in continuous proliferation of increasing efficiency and circular creativity requires that any logic that is translated into material



implements becomes, in turn, the means to create more novel, encompassing, and efficient computer logics. This is the subjecting process wherein one is compelled to constantly engage in research that is not designed only to discover new facts, but to invent new ways to establish logics that would become factually efficient. This is a magic circle. The more we constitute new logics that are translated into material implements, such as computers, the more we are capable to use the same computers to open up new logics for their own material implementation. But the point of this magic circle is an increase in possibilities of valuative selectivity. The latest computer machines can perform calculations that previous logics were incapable of performing. In this sense, the very latest machines can instruct us about the possibilities of new logics (Jonas 1981).

There is an available dogma that computer science is objective and has no need for any values; after all, anyone can learn the latest computer programs and the required use of this technology. No doubt. Whether in China or Guatemala, the computer will be regarded as means to process and transmit information. Thus, the view is that computers are purely technical and indifferent means, usable by anyone, and therefore its only value is what particular groups or individuals want to give them. It is like saying that there are trees and whatever people want to make of them will give those trees their value. But this is a wrong analogy, because the computer systems are themselves information, and indeed selected information. First, the imbedded information is a particular logic of the computer (the software); second, its specific material design (the hardware); third, its economic system of values and the modes of production; and finally, the options that it suggests. In this sense, the objectivity of the computer embodies various levels of valuations. Those who acquire the latest machinery do not acquire means of processing and transmitting messages but also the messages of computer logic, embodiment, economy, and basically an entire life world and its social systems. Moreover, the logic of the programs is designed to process information in specific ways. While the user is told that he or she is free to access information, the information is mediated by the logic of the program, the economy of affordability by specific group, in a specific part of the world, and its purposive rationality that would dictate the programs and the messages that the given population will access. In brief, the objective claim that computer rationality is merely a means for anyone dealing with messages is too restrictive to what computer logic is all about.

The implication is obvious: vast populations of the world would be called upon equally to engage in valuation. Do we want the latest hardware to match the latest software? Or, do we want to protect the environment, to educate next generations, to afford decent housing or medical care? It is the case that all things cannot be accomplished at once, and to buy latest hardware may have to be postponed in favor of other human purposes and, therefore, to forego the receiving of messages that are deemed to be objectively accessible for everyone. We are suggesting that the introduction of the computerized systems around the globe is not an innocent presence of means to acquire information, but valuational requirements of peoples and their governments to deal with what is of greater value in a given society. In short, we are not rejecting

the computer logic and its objectivity, yet we wish to show that it belongs in various value contexts. At the center of this valuative complexity, there is also the understanding that currently the valuations are computer mediated. They are systems of significations that are accessible to anyone and anywhere. Valuation here is part of the global selectivity, and the question is what type of value significations are currently prevailing?

### Signitive power

So far so good. But a question remains: why the rush for the newest computer logics, newest and fastest materialization of such logics, and the very transformation of the materials into previously unheard of combinations: chips, conductive systems, miniaturizations, and massification that lead to increasing compacting of functions? Certainly not for the sake of scientific discovery of “objectivity,” since the interests and valuations do not aim at objectivity but at its transformation. The more plausible conclusion is this: the entire process of metaphysical signitive constructions that are directly shifted to application and productivity, imply – strange as it may seem – signitive power. To understand the latter, we want to argue against the notion of causal power of classical tradition: all events in nature have their specific causes. Yet for modern understanding, signification, comprising at one level logical and quantitative inter-connections, has no causal power. The logical connection “If P then Q” (if it rains then the ground will be wet) cannot cause rain, since it is an empty formulation that can be applied to anything. Yet what modern understanding of constructing of logic implies is this: if we want rain, what logico-mathematical formulations must we invent and how such an invention can signify the production of the material conditions for rain. In this sense, valuation implies a selection of logics that are materially signitive and hence are “empowered” to transform the environment. Signitive power, in this sense, becomes the metaphysically preeminent regard toward the world. It appears in socio-economic currency as “power of ideas”, or “clash of views”, or “progress comes from ideas”, or “we need people with creative ideas”, etc. In the classical regard, creative ideas belonged to poetry, theater, and rhetoric, but currently, they are the very power to elicit transformation of the environment, including the human as an aspect of the environment (e.g. genetic reconstruction of the human). Indeed, the battle for signitive power has intensified to such an extent that even some main stream journals are talking about “who owns your ideas?” In short, signification has to be adjudicated socio-economically and even legally (Mann 1998). Once again, one is no longer concerned with “pure metaphysics”, but with metaphysics as power.

The very formulation of logic as purposive and applicable implies that this logic is the basis of power. What we are suggesting is that the ground of various current theories advocating the primacy of discursive power, are premised on the notion of application. Discourse as discourse would have no power unless its significations not only define but also prescribe the rules of transformation of events in a life world. What is at issue here is the radical arbitrariness and contingency of the notion of logic.

While initially logic was regarded as the bearer of necessary rules, capable of deciphering the rational structure of nature, now it is seen as a construct that follows unfounded purposes. In this sense, there can be many logics wherein each is designed to perform a task and hence to be the source of power. As we mention above, the age of information, or what some people call postindustrial society, is totally premised on transmission, appropriation, creation, and combination of signitive processes. Even the traditional notion of capitalism as producing and selling of material values has become redundant. What the material values embody is a level of information that is more important than the material value. In this sense, the information imbedded in computer logic is more valuable than the material production of the computer. This value is of course extended to all social domains. As Jean Baudrillard has pointed out, the social positioning of persons is not economical, but signitive (Baudrillard 1981). People buy signs of importance, even if such signs are simulacra. I am not rich, but I post signs of wealth. This phenomenon of signitive importance is paraded in mass media when peoples of the so-called third world exhibit their computer knowledge and indeed a possession of the latest hardware, despite the fact that the primary needs such as shelter, clothing, food are quite inadequate. In short, we are up to date, and therefore we are significant.

What appears here as a conclusion of Western modern modernity with its metaphysics and ontology is, at one level, a reversal of explanation: the current digitalization of signification and proliferation of information systems reveals that modern science and technology are basically metaphysical, that is signitive.

### Postscript

While current literatures are still talking about economic and material interests, psychological securities and insecurities, and desires of populations to become part of modern history, we contend that these designations are surface appearances of the Western modernization with its metaphysical and ontological grounds that have been unrecognized so far. While we are not the first ones to suggest that formal and mathematical processes are involved in articulating the world, our claim is that there has not been a recognition that the formal-quantitative procedures are at base metaphysical and therefore free from the constraints of space and time, and that they have assumed priority over the material. We contend that the conditions for the possibility of globalization are not economic, psychological, even ideological, but signitive. The reason for this claim is that before a particular people in global economy will acquire the economic conditions to better their lives they have been already informed signitively of what is the better life. And the better life is the possession of modern technology, specifically information technology such as computers and their logic, and above all the value preferences imbedded in this logic. This logic, in turn, is the end of temporality, end of history; it is all encompassing logic that can transmit its values to any village with promises of the production of anything that the logic signifies in global economy.

Of course, the villagers would be able to access the information once they have accepted the latest computer – to access this information. The latter is laden with value offers, specifically with images of the “good life” that will require the materialization of this signitive power. We see the images, then we buy into the global economy to materialize those images in the forms of beauty, sun glasses, jeans, kellogg cereal, and sundry overproduced and overpriced cheap commodities. Computer is the metaphysical logic that has the power to accomplish this task.

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## GYVENAMASIS PASAULIS IR GLOBALIOJI CIVILIZACIJA

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Santrauka

Šiame straipsnyje parodoma, kaip Vakarų modernusis gyvenamasis pasaulis steigiamas, rekonstruojant gamtos aplinką, pagal formalias logikos taisykles, kurios nėra išvedamos iš atsitiktinių faktų. Logikos taisyklės yra atrinktos kaip technikos pagal jų gebą patenkinti „poreikius“ ir drauge formuoti aplinką kaip „techninį gyvenamąjį pasaulį“, kuris tampa globalizuotas kaip „mokslinis“. Toks pasaulis reikalauja, kad kitų gyvenamieji pasauliai taptų modernūs ir techniniai. Tai reiškia, kad globalizuotas techninis pasaulis nėra faktų rinkinys, bet reikšmingos loginių, nelaikiškų ir neerdviškų „komunikacijos“ vektorių sistemos, išskylančios virš bet kokios visuomenės medžiaginių gamybinių klodų.

Reikšminiai žodžiai: atsitiktinystė, formalioji logika, gyvenamasis pasaulis, metafizika, svarba, technika.

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