https://jeelm.vgtu.lt/index.php/IJSPM <p>The International Journal of Strategic Property Management publishes original interdisciplinary research on strategic management of property.&nbsp;<a href="https://journals.vilniustech.lt/index.php/IJSPM/about">More information ...</a></p> Vilnius Gediminas Technical University en-US International Journal of Strategic Property Management 1648-715X <p>Copyright © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Vilnius Gediminas Technical University.</p> <p>This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.</p> https://jeelm.vgtu.lt/index.php/IJSPM/article/view/21456 <p>In the housing market, the prices sellers would be willing to accept to sell their properties exceed the prices buyers would be willing to pay for them. Behavioural economics postulates that this discrepancy is due to the endowment effect, which is a cognitive bias that causes the overvaluation of the goods we own. However, the existing literature lacks theoretical considerations and empirical evidence on the impact of the use of real estate agents by parties to transactions on the endowment effect in the housing market. Therefore, this study aims to assess the influence of real estate brokerage on the endowment effect using the example of the Polish residential market. To achieve the purpose of this study, a lab-in-the-field experiment was conducted with 248 respondents divided into sellers and buyers. The results indicate that the participation of real estate agents during transactions does not lead to the weakening or elimination of the endowment effect but, in some cases, to its intensification, which is due to the framing by buyers and sellers of the commission charged by agents as a loss requiring compensation. This research confirms the inefficiency of commission-based real estate brokerage services and points to possible corrective actions for legislators.</p> Mateusz Tomal Copyright (c) 2024 The Author(s). Published by Vilnius Gediminas Technical University. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 2024-05-17 2024-05-17 28 3 143–151 143–151 10.3846/ijspm.2024.21456 https://jeelm.vgtu.lt/index.php/IJSPM/article/view/21457 <p>Land supply in China is planned by governments, and the supply ratios of various types of land are in relatively rigid administrative control. This paper constructs a DSGE model to study the relationship between land supply marketization in China and economic fluctuations. Moreover, this paper evaluates the social welfare gains from land marketization. We document that the government’s land planning constraint impacts consumption and social welfare through the land price and final output, causing resource misallocation losses in aggregate investment and output. Quantitatively, the optimal upper limit of industrial land supply is about 40% to achieve the maximum social welfare. This paper stresses the necessity of revitalizing China’s land market, and simultaneously speeding up the marketization of collectively operated construction land.</p> Yiyao He Mengyuan Wu Haiwei Jiang Copyright (c) 2024 The Author(s). Published by Vilnius Gediminas Technical University. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 2024-05-17 2024-05-17 28 3 152–162 152–162 10.3846/ijspm.2024.21457